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Preface 
Although the problem of ratio decidendi concerns the essence of law and jus-
tice, very little comparative work between the Continental and Anglo-American 
legal systems has been done on the topic. Legal literature often repeats that it is.' 
one of the sharpest points of contrast between the two legal cultures. Within the 
English speaking legal system, multiple opinions, both concurring and dissenting, 
prevail where dissent among Continental judges only occurs behind closed doors: 
the published decision indeed is always presented as the single and incontestable 
opinion of the whole court. Historical reasons are generally put forward to explain 
that contrast. Where in the Anglo-American Common Law system judges are 
asked - and always have been asked - to present the materials and reasons upon 
which they based their judicial opinions, in Ancien Regime continental Europe it 
was not considered necessary to formulate the reasons of a decision and in most 
courts of the European Continent it was even formally forbidden to the judges, 
until the end of the eighteenth century, to write down or even communicate orally 
"the secrets of their discussions and deliberations". 
To comparatists, this reveals two different cultures among judges and lawyers. 
In Continental Europe there is much emphasis on the idea of judging as a science 
which can be learned and reproduced with an impersonal rigour. The Anglo-Ame-
rican judge is not considered to be such a trained scientist, he is merely a practised 
craftsman. Can the history of ratio decidendi - but also the history of law and 
justice from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century - therefore be reduced to a 
total contradiction between two legal cultures? Is there no possible comparison? 
As well in the Continental as in the Anglo-American legal system materials always 
have been presented and argued to the judges by the lawyers in order to persuade 
them to rule in favor of their clients and, exposed in public or not, the authorities 
put forward have always been used and discussed by those judges. 
As it is the purpose of the Comparative Studies in Continental and Anglo-Ame-
rican Legal History, we thought one would gain new insight into the problem of 
ratio decidendi by studying the question in a historical comparative way in order 
not only to understand the guiding principles of judicial decisions in the Continen-
tal and the Anglo-American legal systems but also to search in their legal history 
why both systems have known separate evolutions. Studies are, of course, in hand 
on the history of court records, though these address the nature of the records 
rather than the jurisprudential problem of how and why decisions came to be ac-
companied by reasons. Our purpose is therefore to compare the Continental tradi-
tion - through the study of the Roman and Canonical doctrine, the commentaries 
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of Ancien Regime jurists and in particularly the practice of the continental supe-
rior courts - with England and the American colonies and, after 1776, also with 
the federal courts and the states of the United States in order to search for an an-
swer to some more particular questions including: the emergence of the practice of 
giving or recording reasons for judicial decisions, the forms which such records 
take, and the problem about their accurancy and the interaction between respect 
for rules (stare decisis or non quieta movere) and the critical re-examination of 
reasons for past decisions when put to a later court. Our focus in this first volume 
is to study the particular reliance on "Case Law Jurisprudence" through examples 
of constitutional, national, regional and local law. 
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